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Andrew Atkeson initiated the discussion by reiterating the two facts
presented in the paper. Regarding short‐term interest rates, he restated
the paper’s finding that, after World War II, most of the movements
observed in the short rate appear to have been interpreted by agents
as being nearly permanent. Regarding risk, Atkeson reiterated the point
that there is a disconnection between the finance literature, which gen-
erates a theory of the term structure and risk premia, and the macro
literature, which generally rules out varying risk premia. In the finance
view of the world, the central bank has no ability to control this risk
component, while in work such as the “Carry Trades and Currency
Crises” paper of this volume, there is some “suspicion” that somehow
this real risk is under the control of the central bank. He viewed the
resolution of this issue as a central challenge going forward.
In response, Stanley Zin offered Francisco Palomino’s research pro-
gram as an example of the type of work that has been reorienting
macroeconomics away from thinking about risk premia as simply noisy
residuals and incorporating preferences that have a real chance of gen-
erating sensible risk premia within a New Keynesian framework. Zin
suggested that one of the goals of the present paper could be to argue
that risk premia are important not only for generating reasonable asset‐
pricing implications but also because they might have some real conse-
quences related to monetary policy.
Michael Woodford agreed that it is important to bring evidence from
the term structure into monetary economics and to integrate models of
the monetary transmission mechanism with models of the term struc-
ture. However, he also disagreed with the paper’s claim that a funda-
mentally different way of understanding how monetary policy affects
the economy is required. He first addressed the authors’ claim that ex-
isting macro models cannot generate the volatility of long rates relative
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short rate is stationary and ergodic. He pointed out that there is no rea-
son to interpret the historical evidence under this assumption. He refer-
enced early versions of Smets and Wouters’s (2007) model of the U.S.
economy, which explain the U.S. history of interest rates and other
macro variables using a Taylor rule with a time‐varying inflation target
modeled as a random walk. That model generates the same predictions
about the monetary transmission mechanism as those of a model with-
out time variation in the inflation target. Hence, modifying the model to
generate the volatility that concerns the authors did not change the pre-
dictions about the nature of desirable stabilization policy or how mone-
tary policy affects the economy relative to expositions that do not
happen to match these trends.
Regarding the importance of risk premia in monetary economics,
Woodford agreed that it is important to understand better where risk
premia come from and what implications they may have for monetary
policy. However, he objected to the claim that the mere existence of risk
premia invalidates our current understanding of the effects of monetary
p o l i c yo nt h ee c o n o m y .H ec i t e dt h er e g r e s s i o nr e s u l t sp r e s e n t e db y
Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006), which show that the expected path of
short rates forecasts subsequent GDP growth, as suggested by the Euler
equation and consistent with the standard view of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism. Conversely, the risk premium cannot forecast sub-
sequentGDPgrowth.Hence,the riskpremiummaynotbeoftremendous
importance for the relationship between the path of short‐term rates and
GDP, which is the central focus in a model of the monetary transmission
mechanism.
Atkeson replied that including a random walk policy target raises
questions about the systematic effects of the policy. Such a target im-
plies that the persistence observed in the data now comes directly from
policy rather than from agents’ expectations. Patrick Kehoe later criti-
cized the use of time‐varying inflation targets for introducing too much
freedom in the model. He maintained that standard models without
such a feature are not able to generate enough volatility in agents’ long‐
run expectations of future short rates to match the volatility of long rates
relative to short rates found in the data.
In terms of risk premia, Atkeson pointed to empirical evidence of a
hump‐shaped response of consumption to nominal interest rate shocks
that is inconsistent with the theoretical consumption Euler equation.
Olivier Blanchard countered that this inconsistency simply reflects the
fact that consumers respond with a delay. He pointed to Ricardo Reis’s
Discussion 460work on inattention, which generates exactly these delayed responses.
Xavier Gabaix seconded the point, saying that it is not obvious why one
should label the difference between the contemporaneous changes in
the interest rate and the growth of consumption as risk when it might
be a reflection of inertial consumers. Marc Giannoni added that there are
many ways to generate the delay in consumption’s response to the inter-
est rate shock and cited the work by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005). He pointed out that, while we may not have a consensus on how
to generate the delay or a fully micro‐founded approach, small devia-
tions from standard models can essentially fix the issue. Atkeson criti-
cized these attempts as reverse engineering that gets one piece of the
model to work but instead generates strange results elsewhere in the
model or in response to other shocks. He added that these attempts also
do not address the tight link between movements in the short rate and
changes in the risk premium.
Marjorie Flavin offered the interaction between durable and nondu-
rable consumption as a way to micro‐found the lag in the consumption
response. A model that incorporates housing subject to adjustment
costs moderates the response of overall consumption to an interest rate
shock. The moderation occurs because adjustment costs prevent a full
reoptimization of housing consumption and because housing and non-
durable consumption are complements. She remarked that we do not
need a new approach to monetary policy but rather a realistic refine-
ment of the current approach. Flavin also asked for more clarity on
t h ec a u s e sb e h i n dt h ev a r y i n gr i s kp r e m i u m .S h ew o n d e r e di ft h e
change in the risk premium reflects changes in the variance of the fun-
damental shocks or changes in preferences toward risk.
G r e g o r yM a n k i wn o t e dt h a tt h es i m p l er e p r e s e n t a t i v ea g e n tE u l e r
equation is indeed too simple. He felt that no consensus has emerged
on what should replace it and that more work is needed on that front.
However, he was puzzled by the authors’ claim that the relation be-
tween long‐run and short‐run yields also poses a fundamental chal-
lenge. He concurred with Woodford’s earlier point that stationarity is
not a required assumption. Furthermore, he pointed out that, even if one
imposes stationarity, the failure cited by the authors rests on the value
of the autocorrelation coefficient. The authors use a value of 0.986,which
may be too low.
John Cochrane suggested that no complicated models or preferences
are needed if monetary policy, rather than affecting risk premia, is un-
derstood as responding to risk coming from elsewhere in the economy.
In that case, the conventional view of the effect of a monetary policy
Discussion 461shock on the economy has nothing to do with risk. Patrick Kehoe agreed
with the first point. He indicated that, when the Fed decides whether to
loweror raise rates,it is always motivated by risk considerations. Hence,
in his view, a model that ignores the risk component is not very useful.
Harald Uhlig concluded the discussion by stressing the point that we
need models that do well both on the asset‐pricing side and on the
macro side. He was wary of using models that fare poorly on the asset‐
pricing side to understand the monetary policy side.
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